

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 17-05-2005		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Foreign Disclosure of Tactics: An Enabler to More Effective Coalition Operations				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) CDR Roy C. Undersander Paper Advisor (if Any): CDR Paul Povlock				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT The United States' National Defense Strategy is a global one. From a military perspective, the US has come full circle since World War II and is once again relying on coalition partners to bring capability and legitimacy to operations around the world. The US has made great strides in the last 15 years to improve its support of coalition partners, and increase their capability with Foreign Military Sales. The perceived interoperability gained by these efforts however, is diminished by the inability to disclose platform Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). The failure to disclose these TTP helps create a situation of non-standard operations, engenders a lack of trust and mitigates unity of effort between the coalition partners and the US. An Aviation Tactics Release/Cross Functional Team (ATR/CFT) would allow the Navy to release tactics to allies at a regional level and it would relieve local pressure on Combatant Commanders (COCOM) to make rash judgment calls on disclosure questions that arise. The ATR/CFT could easily be scaled to start as a prototype addressing only Naval Aviation issues or it could be expanded quickly to address all three major communities in the Navy. The benefits to the COCOM and/or joint task force / multinational forces commander are many: standardized and controlled disclosure of TTP, increased interoperability between US and coalition forces, and ease of planning for exercises and contingency operations. Operational commanders at every level must embrace this concept, support the reengineering of the Navy and other service disclosure processes, and put the disclosure question at the front when developing new lessons learned or TTP.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP), Coalition Forces, Interoperability, Foreign Disclosure					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 24	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept	
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED			c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI**



Foreign Disclosure of Tactics: An Enabler to More Effective Coalition Operations

By

*Roy C. Undersander
Commander, United States Navy*

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

Advisor: CDR Paul Povlock

17 MAY 05

Abstract

Foreign Disclosure of Tactics: An Enabler to More Effective Coalition Operations

The United States' National Defense Strategy is a global one. From a military perspective, the US has come full circle since World War II and is once again relying on coalition partners to bring capability and legitimacy to operations around the world. The US has made great strides in the last 15 years to improve its support of coalition partners, and increase their capability with Foreign Military Sales. The perceived interoperability gained by these efforts however, is diminished by the inability to disclose platform Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). The failure to disclose these TTP helps create a situation of non-standard operations, engenders a lack of trust and mitigates unity of effort between the coalition partners and US.

An Aviation Tactics Release/Cross Functional Team (ATR/CFT) would allow the Navy to release tactics to allies at a regional level and it would relieve local pressure on Combatant Commanders (COCOM) to make rash judgment calls on disclosure questions that arise. The ATR/CFT could easily be scaled to start as a prototype addressing only Naval Aviation issues or it could be expanded quickly to address all three major communities in the Navy.

The benefits to the COCOM and/or joint task force / multinational forces commander are many: standardized and controlled disclosure of TTP, increased interoperability between US and coalition forces, and ease of planning for exercises and contingency operations. Operational commanders at every level must embrace this concept, support the reengineering of the Navy and other service disclosure processes, and put the disclosure question at the front when developing new lessons learned or TTP.

Table of Contents

	Page
Abstract	ii
List of Acronyms	iv
Introduction	1
Disclosure Background	2
National Recognition	5
US Air Force System	7
Balance Between Operations and Security	9
Recommendations	11
Conclusion	16
Bibliography	18

List of Acronyms

A/A – Air to Air
AFTTP – Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
A/G – Air to Ground
AMRAAM – Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile
ASN(RDA) – Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition
ATP – Allied Tactical Publication
ATR/CFT – Aviation Tactics Release/Cross Functional Team
AWFC/TDW – Air Warfare Center/Weapons Tactics Document Division
CFFC – Commander, Fleet Forces Command
CNO – Chief of Naval Operations
COCOM – Combatant Commander
DDA – Delegated Disclosure Authority
FMS – Foreign Military Sales
JTF – Joint Task Force
MNF – Multinational Forces
MOOTW – Military Operations Other Than War
NAE – Naval Aviation Enterprise
NAVAIR – Naval Air Systems Command
NAVOTTSA – Navy Office of Technology Transfer and Security Assistance
Navy IPO – Navy International Programs Office
NOFORN – Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NSAWC – Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center
NTTP – Naval Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
NWDC – Naval Warfare Development Command
TAC D&E – Tactical Development and Evaluation
TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
TTSARB – Technology Transfer and Security Assistance Review Board
US – United States
USAF – United States Air Force
USMC – United States Marine Corps
USN – United States Navy
WWII – World War II

Foreign Disclosure of Tactics: An Enabler to More Effective Coalition Operations

*“The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them”
Ardant du Picq, French Army*

INTRODUCTION

In today's global environment the United States (US) military increasingly finds itself operating in coalitions or alliances. Across the spectrum from combat operations to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), coalition operations have become the norm, rather than the exception. “Nations cannot operate effectively together unless their forces are interoperable. The most important areas for interoperability include language, communications, doctrine, and exchange of information.”¹

Foreign disclosure policy plays a large role in the nation's ability to operate with multinational forces ((MNF), refers to coalition or alliance) in three areas: the release of intelligence, the export of hardware and the release of doctrine. In the past few years there has been much discussion and action on the part of the George W. Bush Administration to improve interoperability, hence standardization and capability, between US forces and MNF, as it applies to communications and exchange of information. Primarily, changes have occurred in regard to intelligence information. Nevertheless, there is one significant aspect of doctrine that has been overlooked by the U.S. Navy when it comes to foreign disclosure. Joint Pub 1 states that “Joint doctrine and its supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures ... achieve U.S. objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical levels”.² When a

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*. Joint Publication 3-16. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2000) I-12.

² U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Joint Publication 1. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 2000), I-8.

commander's goal is to improve standardization and interoperability among a MNF, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) become very important.

By not disclosing (or releasing) TTP associated with the hardware sold to friendly nations, the Navy hampers effective coalition operations. When naval systems are sold to potential coalition partners but the Navy does not provide the associated TTP, any improvement in interoperability due to commonality of hardware is minimized. Navy policies in regard to TTP disclosure have had, and will continue to have a negative effect at the strategic, operational, and unit levels in regard to interoperability.

It is in the best interest of the Navy and joint commanders to push for progressive and timely change to the Navy TTP disclosure process. The case will be made in four steps: looking at the historical perspective, reviewing national recognition, comparison of the Air Force disclosure procedures and addressing the balance between operations and security.

DISCLOSURE BACKGROUND

At present, the Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) is responsible for 306 Navy Warfare Publications, 48% of which are considered platform specific (e.g. F/A-18 tactics as opposed to Air to Ground tactics).³ This is quite different from the Navy that emerged from World War II (WWII) and Korea. In the 1950s through the early 1960s, Navy TTP were dominated by two conditions. First, having come from two wars working with MNF, the Navy had developed Allied TTP and used them when working with the allied countries. Second, the number of countries that the Navy had opportunity to work with was still relatively limited. As a result, Navy policy as late as 1959 was to use the Allied TTP

³ Small, Andy, and David Hellner. Interview by Roy Undersander, 7 April 2005. Code N571/N572, Naval Warfare Development Command. (Author's Personal Collection, Portsmouth, RI) 1.

publications, called Allied Tactical Publications (ATP) and produce a US Navy (USN) addendum if required.⁴ This resulted in improved interoperability for NATO forces, and reduced, or maintained a smaller “US only” library. The negative side to using ATP was that making changes was difficult due to the large multinational member contingent that had to approve the change. In addition, an ATP that was releasable to NATO did not make it releasable to other potential friendly forces.

As the Vietnam era opened, this paradigm shifted. During this period there were two defining conditions that brought the Navy into another phase of foreign disclosure. First, the US was fighting an air war essentially by itself. There was not a need to disclose TTP. Second, Naval Aviation was changing dramatically by bringing on more new types of platforms (e.g. helicopters, early warning, electronic attack, sophisticated fighters and attack) than ever before. Doctrine and tactics to account for expanding capabilities of the air wing were developed internally in the US without participation of coalition partners. As a result, the US Navy, driven by security concerns of the Cold War became increasingly protective of its TTP and reluctant to share.

In 1990 another major step took place when the Secretary of the Navy reorganized and created the Navy International Programs Office (Navy IPO) from the Navy Office of Technology Transfer and Security Assistance (NAVOTTS).⁵ Navy IPO fell under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)). It was charged with providing assistance to Allies by providing programs such as Foreign

⁴ Chief of Naval Operations. *Tactical Doctrine Publications*. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 16 June 1959. OPNAVINST 05600.5G) 2.

⁵ Wither, William. Phone interview with consultant for Foreign Disclosure and Export Solutions by Roy Undersander, Washington, DC, 25 March 2005. (Author’s Personal Collection, Portsmouth, RI) 1.

Military Sales (FMS), cooperative programs, and protection of key technologies.⁶ In and among these system command type functions, which are focused on FMS hardware sales, lies the responsibility to oversee the Navy's foreign disclosure programs, including disclosure reviews of TTP.

Navy IPO addresses TTP release in the following manner in their Department of the Navy Foreign Disclosure Manual: "Tactical employment information may only be authorized for release by Delegated Disclosure Authorities (DDAs) at the Naval Component Commander level or higher."⁷ Additionally, the same TTP disclosure policy is reflected in the specific Technology Transfer and Security Assistance Review Board ((TTSARB) the Navy's top level foreign disclosure policy for worldwide or significant release precedents) Decision Memorandums completed for hardware being sold via FMS. Navy IPO took this position because its personnel resources were inadequate to perform the TTP disclosure function. While they have personnel trained in foreign disclosure procedures they do not have "warfare designated operators". Disclosure of TTP requires knowledge of disclosure procedures and the mission area being addressed. As a result, Navy IPO had to rely on personnel from other staffs which are already over tasked. This culture has led to a situation where coalition countries receive out of date TTP, literally, because of the number of years the process takes. The country may not receive TTP at all.

While component commanders typically have "operators" assigned that deal with FMS, they are not trained in disclosure policy. Nor are they often aware that the TTSARB

⁶ "Mission." *Navy International Programs Office Website*. [16 March 2005] Available [Online]: <<https://www.nipo.navy.mil/mission.cfm>>. Navy International Programs Office. [16 April 2005] 1.

⁷ Navy International Programs Office. *Foreign Disclosure Manual*. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 2004) 74.

for a given piece of hardware states they are the final source for disclosure of TTP. Component commanders do not normally have a published policy on what is releasable. So when a case presents itself, the decision is usually made quickly and not in a consistent manner. Finally, when individual commanders apply policy in their area of responsibility different from another, the consistency of US foreign strategy suffers as well.

NATIONAL RECOGNITION

As stated earlier, the Bush Administration recognized the need to increase interoperability when working with a MNF. In 2002 National Security Policy Directive 19 was issued, directing a review of the Defense Trade Export Policy and National Security. Reasons stated for this review were to improve the interoperability with our allies and increase the capability and pool of countries that can fight along side us.⁸ In March, 2005 the first National Defense Strategy was published. In several different sections the reliance on global partners was emphasized. It was stated that the US needed to increase MNF capabilities and be capable of being the supported or supporting force. In order to do this interoperability needs to be increased.⁹

This is not a new concept. In 1995 the Joint Chiefs of Staff published CJSI 2700.01, an instruction that deals with rationalization, standardization and interoperability (RSI) between the US and other countries. It was significantly revised in 2001 and published as CJSI 2700.01A. One of the main tenants of this policy is “Operate and fight together using

⁸ U.S. President. *Fact Sheet: Bush Administration Review of Defense Trade Export Policy and National Security*. National Security Policy Directive 19. (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, 21 November 2002) 1.

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2005) 7,10,12.

common or compatible doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)".¹⁰ At first glance it might seem that this instruction should provide a “presumption of approval” policy for any TTP disclosure issues that may present themselves. But there are two reasons why this does not occur. First, the language lends itself to “general TTP” as opposed to “platform specific TTP”. As mentioned above, NWDC has 306 Navy Warfare Publications, 48% of which are platform specific TTP. The other publications are either doctrine or general TTP such as “How to Conduct Antisubmarine Warfare”. Second, the instruction acknowledges the role that the Acquisition Community plays in FMS and does not attempt to overlap their responsibility. For a country using USN systems, that brings them back to Navy IPO.

Disclosure issues are not isolated to new coalition partners. Unfortunately, the following example demonstrates the impact that Navy Disclosure Policy has on MNF interoperability with long term allies such as Canada. Canada has referred to operations in Bosnia several times as an example of why their CF-18 squadrons need to have access to US TTP. During those operations, they often found themselves leading large strike packages into Bosnia that included US F/A-18s. But the Canadians were not permitted access to the Top Gun Manual (the USN’s main reference for F/A-18 Air to Air (A/A) and Air to Ground (A/G) tactics), so extra time was required to work out suitable, but less effective TTP for these missions.¹¹ This is by no means an isolated case. In fact, most FMS class desk officers at the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) are routinely approached by the

¹⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Between the United States, Its Allies, and Other Friendly Nations*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 17 December 2001. CJCSI 2700.01A) A2.

¹¹ The Boeing Company. *CF-18 Tactics Manual Pre-Conference Minutes, 27-28 November, 2001*. (St. Louis: The Boeing Company, 2001) 5.

foreign country asking to buy USN TTP. The class desks have been forced in most cases, to deny the countries this information.¹²

One effort to help accomplish the goals of the “National Defense Strategy” and “National Military Strategy” would be increasing the amount of TTP that are released, particularly platform specific ones. A similar emphasis has been put on the release of intelligence information to coalition partners. In this case, the systems used to distribute the intelligence information, as well as the disclosure of the information, are being addressed. For example, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has published a memorandum directing all commands to analyze documents that are marked “not releasable to foreign nationals” (NOFORN) and reclassify them if able.¹³ This particular initiative will also help disclosure of TTP by setting precedence, and potentially expanding the amount of data that could be released. Nevertheless, if release of TTP is to become a reality, the issue will need specific attention from COCOMs and the CNO similar to what was done for sharing of intelligence information.

US AIR FORCE SYSTEM

Prior to 1997 the US Air Force (USAF) had similar processes for disclosure of TTP. After Operation Desert Storm, the same issues of interoperability with coalition forces came up. In 1997 Gen Ryan, then USAF Chief of Staff, pushed for and made possible the changes that took place at the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA). SAF/IA is the counterpart to Navy IPO, except that SAF/IA is manned with more

¹² Undersander, Roy. *Information Brief: Disclosure of Tactics to FMS*. Power Point brief given to VADM Massenburg, Commander, NAVAIRSYSCOM, 25 October 2004. (Author’s Personal Collection, Portsmouth, RI 1).

¹³ Chief of Naval Operations. *Security Classification Marking Instructions*. Memorandum. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 8 March 2005. Ser N09N2/5U980878) 1.

active duty “operators”. SAF/IA wrote a disclosure policy in regard to platform specific TTP. They also developed a tiered system for the FMS countries. Essentially “US only” tactics (these make up a small percentage of the TTP) are omitted and the remaining information is divided up based on the policy and tiered system of countries. The policy, titled “Guidelines for Release of USAF Tactics and Capabilities” is then given to a contractor that works with the US Air Force (USAF) Air Warfare Center/Weapons Tactics Documentation Division (AWFC/TDW), which is responsible for development of Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP). The contractor is tasked with taking the domestic version of a given platform and rendering a FMS version. At that point the AFTTP 3-1, 3-3 (classified and unclassified platform tactics publications) are returned to SAF/IA for final approval and release. Currently this last step is the only part that is lagging. SAF/IA is currently taking up to a year to review and approve any TTP documents.¹⁴

What does this accomplish for the COCOM? When the FMS TTP documents are completed attachment six is added to the domestic, AFTTP 3-1, Vol 1 (common to all platforms) which summarizes what information has been disclosed to the given countries. This does two things for the USAF operator. First, if a USAF squadron is going to participate in a MNF exercise, they automatically know what can be disclosed to the countries and what cannot. There is no need to go to the component commander and ask for rash judgments by personnel not qualified, but expected to make the decision. Second, when a MNF Commander is planning for contingencies, the 3-1, Vol 1 is a source to consult for given coalition country capabilities. The commander can also expect that if he puts USAF

¹⁴ McCloskey, Michael. *Tiered Release of U.S. Navy Tactics to FMS Customer Countries*. Point Paper. (Washington, DC: Foreign Disclosure and Export Solutions, 2004) 1.

and “Coalition Country A” F-16s together, they will have set standards to work from. The same cannot be said for US Navy and “Coalition Country B” F/A-18s or any other Navy or Marine Corps platform that is sold to coalition partners.

The USAF has had the TTP disclosure process in place for over 8 years. SAF/IA meets periodically to review the “Guidelines for Release of USAF Tactics and Capabilities” policy and make sure that the program is in compliance with foreign strategy. The program has been a great success with over 25 countries participating. Again, Canada demonstrates how important this TTP is to them. They have bought Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to use on their CF-18s. Since the Navy would not release TTP related to use of the weapon on the F/A-18, the Canadians went to the USAF to buy the TTP. Canada also asked if the USAF would build them an A/G TTP publication for the CF-18. The USAF stated that they were not allowed to do that since the CF-18 is a USN managed FMS program. In the course of the discussion, the Canadians have now considered buying an F-16 TTP publication, since the tactics of how weapons are employed are similar.¹⁵

BALANCE BETWEEN OPERATIONS AND SECURITY

Much of the Navy’s unofficial policy of not disclosing TTP stems from the lack of manpower and insufficient processes. However, there are personnel in Navy IPO and Office of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) staff, N525 (also involved with International Programs) that see the issue truly as one of security. They view attempts made by systems commands to release TTP to be motivated by money and not security or interoperability of the US. There are indeed measures that need to be taken in order to safeguard US military tactics, such as

¹⁵ Henderson, Earl. Phone interview with consultant for AVTECH Research Corporation by Roy Undersander, Las Vegas, NV, 28 April 2005. (Author’s Personal Collection, Portsmouth, RI) 1.

developing the Tiered Country List and reviewing at a strategic level what TTP the USN deems necessary to share with coalition partners.

It could be argued that the risk to security is higher by not developing a process to release TTP. First, Navy TTP would be more secure because disclosure of TTP would not be done in an ad hoc way, with each component commander making his/her own decisions. Second, in order to make this process change, more attention will have to be given to the issue. Whether it is military, civilian or contractor, more people actively looking at the program will raise the level of awareness, and hence security. Third, Department of Defense Directive 5230.11 states that the Unified Commander, in time of hostilities can release whatever information he deems necessary.¹⁶ While this may have some application for intelligence, it would be irresponsible to make a Unified Commander (or COCOM) make decisions on sharing TTP. Trying to exercise this caveat would lead to rash decisions or even worse, no decision at all. Fourth, as stated in CJCSI 2700.01A, an individual that is representing the US at a MNF meeting is responsible for knowing what can be discussed and not to make false impressions or be inconsistent with other delegates.¹⁷ As discussed in the USAF TTP foreign disclosure system described previously, attachment six in AFTTP 3-1 Vol I would enable individuals to better and confidently represent the US. Finally, as described above, if USN and US Marine Corps (USMC) aircraft cannot operate with coalition partners flying the same hardware, joint commanders will be less likely to use

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Defense. *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 16 June 1992. Directive 5230.11) 4.

¹⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *International Military Agreements for Rationalization*, A3.

Naval Air in favor of more standardized USAF squadrons. This will impact the Navy and reduce flexibility for the MNF Commander.

Operational benefits are many. First, it would save time. Currently, every TTP disclosure decision (if made at all) takes weeks to adjudicate, either slowing down an exercise or severely limiting the activity. Second, TTP disclosure would help bring about more efficient and meaningful planning for exercises or contingencies by giving the planners a source to gage capabilities and potential for interoperability between coalition partners. Finally, it would allow individual foreign pilots who come to the US for training, to gain more tactical standardization with US counterparts from the first flight on. Providing the more rigorous and valuable training would immediately start to build the coalition trust that is required for unity of effort.

Unity of effort is paramount when leading a MNF. Disclosure of TTP supports many of the factors that contribute to strong unity of effort such as developing simple plans, actions to improve interoperability, and establishing and maintaining trust.¹⁸ The CF-18 example above in which the Canadians are considering buying an F-16 AFTTP is an unsatisfactory scenario having strategic/operational ramifications. The situation creates frustration and lack of trust which will erode the unity of effort that has existed between Canada and the US. It also creates problems at the unit level, because the TTP the Canadians use with their CF-18s will still not be standardized with USN tactics.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While US Navy culture and policy have convoluted the disclosure process for TTP, there are several initiatives that could be implemented immediately to improve the process

¹⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 1997) 722.

and hence improve interoperability with coalition forces. First and foremost is that COCOMs, component commanders, and the CNO must take foreign disclosure of TTP on as a special project and give it the required focus until the issue is corrected. While the systems commands see the problem and are the ones that often deal with the foreign customers, they are not in the operational chain of command, and therefore lend little credence when they speak about the issue. When CNO N525 was initially briefed by NAVAIR on the subject, N525's bottom line answer was that they wanted to hear the requirement from the operational commanders.¹⁹ SAF/IA would have had a hard time making the changes they made had it not been for Gen. Ryan's endorsement of the FMS TTP plan.

Second, go back to using Multinational Publications as the main source for TTP, whether it is general or platform specific. In response to US lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm, NATO has rendered releasable Multinational versions of key ATP.²⁰ There is no reason that something similar could not be done for platform specific TTP. The advent of Extensible Markup Language (XML), a specification that was developed to host documents on the web, makes the idea even more credible. XML allows for efficiencies in editing which would make the sharing of specific information with coalition partners much easier. Once the multinational TTP are developed it would also be advantageous to have coalition TTP conferences. This initiative would truly solidify the interoperability and even increase it by drawing on other sources for development of new TTP.

Third, fix the Navy TTP Foreign Disclosure Process. NAVAIR has started to work on the issue. An Analysis of Alternatives was completed, which looked at several potential

¹⁹ Undersander, *Disclosure of Tactics to FMS*, 2.

²⁰ Small and Hellner, Interview, 1.

ways to fix the process. Options range from continuing to work through Navy IPO, to tasking tactics development commands with disclosure responsibility, to even having reservists fulfill the requirement. The optimum solution and one that was briefed up the NAVAIR chain of command was to implement an Aviation Tactics Release Cross Functional Team (ATR/CFT). The ATR/CFT would be governed by a CNO charter or OPNAV instruction that would delineate who is a member of the team, how often they must meet and ensure that the disclosure would be conducted within standards of National Disclosure Policy. This solution assumes that Navy IPO retains all functions except for disclosure of TTP which would be delegated down to another command.

The team would nominally consist of an O-6 Chairman from Naval Strike & Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) and then O-5/6 representation from LANTFLT, PACFLT, NAVEUR, NAVCENT and I & II MEF.²¹ The ATR/CFT would meet and develop a two year Regional Tactics Disclosure Plan, taking into account the country TTSARB, country capability/support, regional requirements and world precedent. When an FMS case was opened, a contractor would use the Tactics Disclosure Plan to build a TTP from the domestic TTP. The FMS TTP would be reviewed, and coordinated with the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) and ultimately approved by Commander Naval Air Forces.²² This plan could easily be expanded to the submarine and surface communities by moving the approval authority up to Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC). As mentioned before this is not just an

²¹ McCloskey, Michael. *OPNAVINST 3510.XX, Foreign Disclosure of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Air Naval Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Air NTTP)*. Draft. (Washington, DC: Foreign Disclosure and Export Solutions, 20 October 2004) 5.

²² McCloskey, Michael and William Wither. *Aviation Tactics Disclosure Process: An Analysis of Alternatives*. Power Point brief given to RDML Wieringa, NAVAIR 4.0, 10 February 2005. (Washington, DC: Foreign Disclosure and Export Solutions, 2005) 15.

aviation issue. There are foreign submarine fleets that have needed to see US sub TTP due to the proximity of assets and operations they were going to carry out together. In this case the coalition country didn't even operate the same equipment, but the operations they were conducting with the US required them to see US TTP to operate effectively and safely.²³

This example illustrates why TTP disclosure could potentially be moved up to the CFFC level. CFFC would be better equipped to coordinate disclosure not only based on regional strategy, but take into account all three communities within the Navy as well.

Fourth, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) needs to expand its responsibility for Air Naval Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (NTTP) to include liaison with USAF AWFC/TDW to ensure that efforts of the individual services are complimentary to US strategy. AWFC/TDW is in the unique position of supporting platform specific TTP for the USAF, USN and USMC. The organization is a natural coordination point for the US efforts.

Fifth, disclosure needs to be thought about at the front of the tactics development process instead of as an after thought. Too many times, platform tactics are developed from lessons learned or tactical development and evaluation (TAC D&E) and written down by junior officers who know nothing about security classification. The officers take the safe, expedient route and classify a product “Secret NOFORN” and classified by “Multiple Sources”. This practice has led to a situation where the Navy has a host of TTP publications that should be released to coalition partners, but are not, because it is cost prohibitive, due to the work hours required to track down the sources and remove the “NOFORN” marking. However, now is the right time for the Navy to make this investment.

²³ Small and Hellner, Interview, 1.

Approximately three years ago the Navy undertook an initiative to revamp and update its Air NTTP. This is when the USN and USMC joined with AWFC/TDW at Nellis AFB to produce all of the TTP for US military aircraft. The Navy is currently starting the second round of TTP conferences under the new system. This would be the optimum time to address the classification markings in the domestic publications. Disclosure specialists should be assigned to help the conference delegates get through the bow wave of old material and provide training to help the permanent staff become self sufficient.

NWDC is also leading initiatives that put disclosure in the front, by looking at a process that would identify new TAC D&E experiments and Tactical Memos as releasable to coalition partners immediately. When the TTP is validated, potentially with coalition help, there would be no delay incorporating it into MNF TTP.²⁴ Operational commanders need to keep this in mind as well when their staffs are gathering lessons learned. Staffs do not have to decide which country the information is releasable to, they just have to make the decision as to the potential for use by coalition forces and what source the information came from. As long as material is not marked “NOFORN”, the decision can easily be made later to release it to another country.

Finally, disclosure of TTP needs to be done efficiently and in a timely manner. As the size of the active duty Navy has continued to shrink there are fewer “operators” who are available to perform this type of work. Therefore, it is imperative that the Navy shed its bureaucratic stigmas that insist on disclosure being done by a government person. The program should have oversight from either OPNAV, CFFC or CNAF, but the majority of the work, including approval of a given TTP should be opened up to contract support personnel

²⁴ Ibid

(former operators). All of this labor except for the active duty personnel that make up the ATR/CFT could be funded from the FMS cases.

CONCLUSION

The United States' National Defense Strategy is a global one. From a military perspective, the US has come full circle from WWII and is once again relying on coalition partners to bring capability and legitimacy to operations around the world. The US has made great strides in the last 15 years to improve its support of coalition partners and increase their capability with FMS. The perceived interoperability gained by these efforts however, is diminished by the inability to disclose various types of information to foreign countries. This sets up a situation of non-standard operations, lack of trust and unity of effort between the coalition partners and the US.

The disclosure shortcoming has been recognized at the highest ranks in the US chain of command. Executive Orders dealing with classification and release have been amended to address issues dealing with intelligence information, and efforts are being made to even improve the hardware and architecture used to distribute intelligence information. Nevertheless, another type of information that is important in peace time as well as war has been overlooked. Service or platform specific TTP is essential to share with coalition partners to truly maximize standardization and interoperability.

The ATR/CFT would allow tactics release to be addressed on a regional basis and it would relieve local pressure on component commanders to make rash judgment calls on disclosure questions that come up. This process should be inexpensive to institute since most of the cost can be charged to the FMS cases. The ATR/CFT could easily be scaled to start as

a prototype addressing only Naval Aviation or it could be expanded quickly to address all three major communities in the Navy.

The benefits to the COCOM, component commander and/or joint task force (JTF)/MNF commander are many. First, the regional based tactics release would allow for a standardized and controlled disclosure of TTP. Second, interoperability among countries with common hardware would go up. Third, planning would be much more realistic and accurate, because mission planners would understand coalition country capabilities and they would know which TTP from the US could be discussed or used immediately, without having to discuss the issue first, or wait for weeks for a decision. This is true for exercises as well as contingency operations. Finally, foreign students being trained in the US would learn realistic TTP from a larger data base. This will lead to more capable pilots as well as unity of effort and trust when they show up for a MNF exercise or operation.

While there are valid concerns from a security perspective, that need to be heeded, the essential processes are in place to mitigate the security risk and insure that the required TTP are disclosed to coalition partners. In the long run the rigorous exercise of these processes will improve the overall security and survivability of US and coalition forces alike. Operational commanders at every level must embrace this concept, support the reengineering of the Navy and other service disclosure processes and put the disclosure question at the front when developing new lessons learned or TTP. In an age of “Effects-based Operations” and constrained budgets this is an easy and inexpensive way for the operational commander to increase effectiveness of US and coalition forces.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bloomfield, Lincoln P., Jr. *Remarks to the Society for International Affairs*. London: Society for International Affairs, 3 June 2004. Available [Online]:
[<http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/control/bloomfield_sia.htm>](http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/control/bloomfield_sia.htm). Federation of American Scientists [16 APR 2005]

Chief of Naval Operations. *Security Classification Marking Instructions*. Memorandum. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 8 March 2005. Ser N09N2/5U980878.

_____. *Tactical Doctrine Publications*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 16 June 1959. OPNAVINST 05600.5G.

Henderson, Earl. Phone interview with consultant for AVTECH Research Corporation by Roy Undersander, Las Vegas, NV, 28 April 2005. Author's Personal Collection, Portsmouth, RI.

Hura, Myron, Gary McLeod, Eric Larson, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Daniel Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin O'Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, and Lewis Jamison. *Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000. MR-1235-AF

Larson, Eric, Gustav Lindstrom, Myron Hura, Ken Gardiner, Jim Keffer, and Bill Little. *Interoperability of U.S. and NATO Allied Air Forces: Supporting Data and Case Studies*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2003. MR-1630-AF.

McCloskey, Michael. *Charter: Aviation Tactics Release Council*. Washington, DC: Foreign Disclosure and Export Solutions, 8 October 2004.

_____. *OPNAVINST 3510.XX, Foreign Disclosure of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Air Naval Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Air NTTP)*. Draft. Washington, DC: Foreign Disclosure and Export Solutions, 20 October 2004.

_____. *Tiered Release of U.S. Navy Tactics to FMS Customer Countries*. Point Paper. Washington, DC: Foreign Disclosure and Export Solutions, 2004.

McCloskey, Michael and William Wither. *Analysis of Alternatives*. Document in support of brief to NAVAIR 4.0, 10 February 2005. Washington, DC: Foreign Disclosure and Export Solutions, 2005.

_____. *Aviation Tactics Disclosure Process: An Analysis of Alternatives*. Power Point brief given to RDML Wieringa, NAVAIR 4.0, 10 February 2005. Washington, DC: Foreign Disclosure and Export Solutions, 2005.

“Mission.” *Navy International Programs Office Website*. [16 March 2005] Available [Online]: <<https://www.nipo.navy.mil/mission.cfm>>. Navy International Programs Office. [16 April 2005].

Navy International Programs Office. *Foreign Disclosure Manual*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 2004.

Small, Andy, and David Hellner. Interview by Roy Undersander, 7 April 2005. Code N571/N572, Naval Warfare Development Command. Author’s Personal Collection, Portsmouth, RI.

The Boeing Company. *CF-18 Tactics Manual Pre-Conference Minutes, 27-28 November, 2001*. St. Louis: The Boeing Company, 2001.

Undersander, Roy. *Information Brief: Disclosure of Tactics to FMS*. Power Point brief given to VADM Massenburg, Commander, NAVAIRSYSCOM, 25 October 2004. Author’s Personal Collection, Portsmouth, RI.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Support. *International Programs Security Handbook*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1993.

Under Secretary of Defense. *Security Classification Marking Instructions*. Memorandum. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 27 September 2004.

U.S. Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology. *Coalition Military Operations: The Way Ahead Through Cooperability*. Report of a French-German-UK-U.S. Working Group, April 2000. Arlington: U.S.CREST, 2000.

_____. *Future Military Coalitions: The Transatlantic Challenge*. Report of a French-German-UK-U.S. Working Group, September 2002. Arlington: U.S. CREST, 2002.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Implementation of, and Compliance With, Arms Control Agreements*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 9 January 2001. Directive 2060.1.

_____. *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 16 June 1992. Directive 5230.11.

_____. *Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 9 April 1996. Directive 5230.9.

_____. *International Agreements*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 11 June 1987, Change 1 18 February 1991. Directive 5530.3.

_____. *Management and Control of Information Requirements*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 11 June 1993. Directive 8910.1.

_____. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004.

_____. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2005.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Between the United States, Its Allies, and Other Friendly Nations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 17 December 2001. CJCSI 2700.01A.

_____. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Joint Publication 3-0. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 2001.

_____. *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*. Joint Publication 3-16. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2000.

_____. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Joint Publication 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 2000.

_____. *The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 1997.

U.S. President. *Fact Sheet: Bush Administration Review of Defense Trade Export Policy and National Security*. National Security Policy Directive 19. Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, 21 November 2002.

_____. *Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 4200 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 19 May 2004.

U.S. Secretary of Navy. *The Technology Transfer and Security Assistance Review Board (TSARB)*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 16 December 1992. SECNAVINST 4900.46B.

_____. *Disclosure of Classified Military Information and Controlled Unclassified Information to Foreign Representatives*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 8 October 2004. SECNAVINST 5510.34A.

Wither, William. Phone interview with consultant for Foreign Disclosure and Export Solutions by Roy Undersander, Washington, DC, 25 March 2005. Author's Personal Collection, Portsmouth, RI.